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The Principle of Modal Realism Equivalence
By Paul Almond |
13 August 2008 |
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The principle of modal realism equivalence states that the methodology we apply for
making statistical predictions about the world and the results obtained should be the
same regardless of whether or not modal realism is true. If modal realism is true then
probability calculations would be about where we are likely to be in the set of different,
actual worlds. If modal realism is false then they would be about which is likely to be the actual world in
the set of possible worlds. Both approaches differ only in the semantics of "possible" and "actual".
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The Theistic Apologist's Worst Nightmare: A Reality In Which Time Is Unimportant
By Paul Almond |
03 August 2008 |
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Some views of reality feature time as a constructed phenomenon instead of part of the
fundamental framework of reality. These kinds of views have serious consequences for some
arguments used to support the existence of God by claiming that God is needed to "cause"
the universe, because they relegate time and causality to an unimportant, and possibly
parochial, position. Further, if most of reality is atemporal, as some views now suggest,
then the entire concept of God is questionable because it appears to rely on concepts such
as intention which only make sense as temporal ideas.
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Civilization-Level Quantum Suicide
By Paul Almond |
02 June 2008 |
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If you think quantum suicide is valid then you should expect an advanced civilization to
think that quantum suicide at the level of an entire civilization is valid, as you should
expect it to know anything that you know. If you also think the technological singularity
idea is correct then you should expect a civilization to start performing
civilization-level quantum suicide around the time it undergoes a technological
singularity. Motives for quantum suicide could be quantum suicide reality
editing - using quantum suicide to enter desirable situations - and quantum suicide
computing - using quantum suicide to gain huge computing capability. This provides
possible answers for the Fermi paradox, the Doomsday argument and the simulation
hypothesis. This article is not arguing for or against the validity of quantum suicide,
but merely considering implications of quantum suicide being valid.
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Minds, Substrate, Measure and Value - Part 3: The Problem of Arbitrariness of Interpretation
By Paul Almond |
11 May 2008 |
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Previous articles in this series argued that probability in some thought experiments in
which you are unsure about your status is based on the substrates on which algorithms are
running and that the nature of the substrate is statistically relevant to the measure
with which an algorithm runs and affects the measure of any minds associated with such
algorithms. This article provides a deeper explanation by discussing arbitrariness of
interpretation. Previously called "multiple realizability" by John Searle, this is the
problem caused by the need to apply an interpretation to a physical system to say that
it is running an algorithm and the possibility of applying any interpretation to obtain
any algorithm, leading to an apparent observer subjectivity in the algorithms that a
physical system is running. Searle argues that multiple realizability makes the strong AI
hypothesis incoherent. This conclusion is unnecessary, although the strong AI hypothesis
needs some clarification. Instead, the many-interpretations position is proposed
to deal with the issue of observer subjectivity.
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Minds, Substrate, Measure and Value - Part 2: Extra Information About Substrate Dependence
By Paul Almond |
03 November 2007 |
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A continuation of the series of articles exploring the relationship between minds and
physical systems (substrates) on which they are based. The previous
article Minds, Substrate, Measure and Value, Part 1: Substrate Dependence used
a thought experiment to show that substrate matters, but not in the way that John Searle
thinks. It was shown that the substrate influences the probabilities that you are in
various situations in some thought experiments in which there is uncertainty about the
substrate on which you currently exist. The substrate is statistically important
and influences the measure of minds associated with computing done on it. This article
will strengthen the argument made in the previous article.
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Minds, Substrate, Measure and Value - Part 1: Substrate Dependence
By Paul Almond |
12 September 2007 |
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The first in a series of articles exploring the relationship between minds and substrates
on which they are based. Strong AI advocates typically maintain that the substrate is
irrelevant, provided that the required computation can be performed on it, and only the
computation matters. John Searle, an opponent of strong AI, argues that the substrate
does matter and that a mind is not just computation on a substrate but is caused by
specific physical processes. Searle states that there is no reason to assume that all
substrates that allow general computation can support minds. A thought experiment will show that
the substrate matters, but not in the way that Searle thinks. The substrate matters
statistically and affects the measure of a mind.
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Planning As Modelling: A New Version
By Paul Almond |
29 July 2007 |
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Describes a revised version of the planning as modelling approach to planning in
artificial intelligence (AI). Planning As Modelling is based on the idea that planning
is prediction and uses an AI system's modelling system to produce probabilistic
predictions of future behaviour that are equivalent to planning of future
behaviour. The tree search approach described in earlier articles is no longer necessary,
the processing that it did being absorbed into the modelling system as part of its
prediction. A provisional patent application has been filed with the US Patent and
Trademark Office (Application Number: 60/952490, EFS ID: 202167,
Receipt Date: 27 July 2007), followed by a full utility patent application
(Application Number: 12181296, EFS ID: 3690562, Receipt Date: Monday 28 July 2008)
relating to this article.
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Planning As Modelling: A Revised Description
By Paul Almond |
27 April 2007 |
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Describes the planning as modelling approach to planning in artificial
intelligence (AI). This uses an AI system's modelling system to produce probabilistic
predictions of future behaviour that are equivalent to planning of future
behaviour. The article combines concepts from previous articles about planning as
modelling.
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Resolving the Horizon Problem in Planning As Modelling
By Paul Almond |
30 March 2007 |
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Previous articles such as Planning as Modelling in AI
and Programming of Planning as Modelling in AI suggested the planning as modelling approach to planning
in artificial intelligence.
Planning as modelling provides AI planning by using the AI's modelling
system to produce probabilistic predictions of future behaviour equivalent to planning
of future behaviour. The approach as described previously has a "horizon" problem.
Planning as modelling is supposed to limit the searching required for optimum behaviour
according to the likelihood of different possible futures. A course of action could be
found desirable after being considered part of an unlikely future, the previous
consideration that the behaviour is unlikely meaning its selection was based on a
shallow, and therefore possibly unreliable, search. This article will modify planning
as modelling to deal with this problem.
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A Refutation of Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument - and why it even suggests a disproof of God
By Paul Almond |
28 February 2007 |
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Alvin Plantinga's modal ontological argument is intended to prove God's existence
without reference to empirical observation, but instead showing that the existence of God
logically follows from the definition of God. The argument suggests that the
actual existence of God follows from the possible existence of God as a necessary entity.
This article will show that the modal ontological argument is invalid and, worse, that
the assumptions in the modal ontological argument are more useful in disproving
God's existence.
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Why Is Space 3D?
By Paul Almond |
21 January 2007 |
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Our perception of the world is that it has 3D space. This highly speculative article will
suggest an anthropic explanation of this. The article supports an ensemble view of
reality in which many space-times exist and considers the type of space-time in which
most observers will find themselves. It is suggested that such a space-time is the type
in which we should most likely expect to find ourselves.
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Can God Exist Outside Space-Time?
By Paul Almond |
20 January 2007 |
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Many theists claim that God exists outside of space-time and created it. This article
will show that this is incoherent without significant qualification.
An attempt is made to interpret the concept of "creation" in a tenseless,
or atemporal (timeless), way and it is then shown that it still does not work without significant qualification on account of it
being ontologically meaningless to claim any difference between the "creator" and the
"created" in an atemporal situation. Although there are ways in which the concept could be qualified to make it coherent,
this may reduce God's resemblance to the entity claimed to exist by theists.
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Programming of Planning As Modelling in AI
By Paul Almond |
28 December 2006 |
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Previous articles such as Planning as Modelling in AI suggested the planning as modelling approach to planning
in artificial intelligence. This provides planning in an AI system by using the AI's
modelling system to produce probabilistic predictions of future behaviour that are
equivalent to planning of future behaviour. This article will provide example computer
programs in Pascal for planning as modelling.
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Planning as Modelling in AI
By Paul Almond |
26 November 2006 |
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Previous articles, How AI Would Work and Occam’s Razor Part 9: Representation and Planning of Actions in Artificial Intelligence, described planning as modelling, an approach
to planning in AI which breaks the partition between planning and modelling which has traditionally been a
feature of AI. In planning as modelling the AI system's predictions of its own future behaviour are used
to plan its future behaviour. Planning therefore occurs almost completely within the modelling system as a
trivial special case of modelling. In previous articles planning as modelling was discussed in the context
of the specific hierarchical, probabilistic modelling system which has been proposed. The idea is more
general than this and can be used with other probabilistic modelling systems. This article will describe
planning as modelling in a more general context, separate from the specific details of the probabilistic
hierarchy previously proposed, so that planning as modelling is easier to understand and not seen as
dependent on other features of the AI system. It will also describe a change to the concept described
in previous articles about planning which will improve the AI system’s planning ability by including
inputs in its search for optimum behaviour.
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Downward Transfer of Probabilities in AI
By Paul Almond |
15 October 2006 |
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My previous article How AI Would Work and
other articles proposed an approach to AI in which probabilities of meanings obtained
from probabilistic interpretation of partial models are stored in a hierarchy.
Information on the bottom level of the hierarchy, where input and output events occur,
is abstracted on higher levels. Downward transfer of probabilities is an important
process in the AI system, but has not yet been described in any detail. This article
will give an idea of how downward transfer of probabilities could work.
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AI as a Boundary System
By Paul Almond |
17 September 2006 |
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Proposes a paradigm for dealing with the AI (artificial intelligence) system suggested
in my previous article How AI Would Work and other
articles. The paradigm is that of an AI system as a boundary system – a system with limited
capabilities, confined to a simple, basic “layer” of computation between two “worlds” - outside reality
and the AI system’s own functional hierarchy.
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How AI Would Work
By Paul Almond |
04 September 2006 |
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Outlines how artificial intelligence (AI) should work. In previous articles I have
proposed an approach for making AI, but I have not yet outlined it in a single
article. This article will give an overview of the proposed AI system. This article is
not a substitute for previous articles, but it should make my approach more
accessible. It will also provide a discussion of how the carpet texture problem can be
resolved in this system.
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Funding of Ambitious Projects
By Paul Almond |
05 August 2006 |
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Very ambitious projects have a track record of going nowhere. Why should anyone invest in a dangerous, ambitious project like this when it is well known that they tend to fail?
This is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Anyone considering investing has to consider the problem that ambitious projects tend to fail by not achieving adequate investment and this is likely to dissuade many investors. This expectation of failure, however, can be the very cause of the failure! This article will describe how the routine availability of conditional investment could be a solution for this problem.
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Occam's Razor Part 9: Representation and Planning of Actions in Artificial Intelligence
By Paul Almond |
29 July 2006 |
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Describes use of the probabilistic, hierarchical ontology from the previous article in planning. With the previous article this gives an overview of how an intelligent machine would work, from processing of sensory inputs to acting. There is no separate, hierarchical planning system, "closely-coupled" to the hierarchy of meaning extraction from sensory inputs, for transmitting actions down to the bottom level of the hierarchy, as may be expected. The hierarchical model makes predictions about reality and the planning of actions is really just the system predicting its own behaviour, so planning is modelling and can be performed by the modelling system.
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Occam's Razor Part 8: Modelling in Artificial Intelligence
By Paul Almond |
09 June 2006 |
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Builds on previous articles in the series to show how a computer can use sensory inputs obtained from reality to assemble a probabilistically and hierarchically expressed worldview - a model of how reality works. This is explored in some detail and the emphasis is on making intelligent machines rather than philosophy.
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How to Rig an Internet Election
By Paul Almond |
04 May 2006 |
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This article will describe a weakness in the security of Internet voting processes. Although an electoral process may be well defended against direct electoral attacks it will be much harder to defend it against indirect electoral attacks. I will explain what I mean by direct and indirect attacks and how an indirect attack could be made: I will be showing how to rig an Internet election.
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Occam's Razor Part 7: Hierarchy and Ontology
By Paul Almond |
30 April 2006 |
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This is the latest article in the series on Occam's razor. The previous article
proposed that partial models are best described by meaning extraction algorithms,
but did not include any concept of hierarchy. This article will show how the previous
concept of partial models as meaning extraction algorithms can be extended to allow
construction of hierarchical models. There will also be an ontological discussion
relating this to the concept of "existence".
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Many-Worlds Assisted Mind Uploading: A Thought Experiment
By Paul Almond |
06 April 2006 |
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This article proposes and discusses a thought experiment relating to mind uploading,
the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, quantum suicide and quantum
immortality. This is a speculative article and I do not take a final position on all
of the issues that it raises, but it facilitates philosophical discussion about what we
are and what continuity of self means.
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Occam's Razor Part 6: Partial Models as "Envelopes"
By Paul Almond |
26 February 2006 |
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To use Occam's razor in artificial intelligence, or to test real claims, we need a
better way of representing models than what we have been discussing so far. It must be
general enough to express any human models of reality and must somehow allow concepts
within a model to relate to concepts within a human equivalent of the same model.
This is the subject of this article. It will not deal directly with Occam's razor,
but rather with how we can describe partial models differently to enable a complete
worldview to be described by a number of partial models being used together.
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When Are People Responsible?
By Paul Almond |
09 February 2006 |
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There is controversy about the extent to which we should hold people "responsible"
for actions. In some situations we say that a person is "responsible" for an action,
but in others, despite the act being committed, that he/she is not "responsible".
What is this "responsibility"? If we can say when people have it and when they do not
then we would be answering this question. Common ideas about assigning responsibility
are too vague or inconsistent to be philosophically useful. This article will suggest
an approach that is consistent and could be formalized.
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Occam's Razor Part 5: How Mapping Can Work
By Paul Almond |
14 January 2006 |
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The previous articles in this series have set out assumptions needed for Occam's
razor to work and started a justification of it. The concept of "mapping" of partial
models onto complete models has been used, but no explanation has been given of what
it means to say that a partial model "maps onto" a complete model. This article will
show how a partial model can be said to "map onto" a complete model and why partial
models favoured by Occam's razor will tend to map onto large numbers of complete
models, making them more likely to be "correct".
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Occam's Razor Part 4: An Overview of How Occam's Razor Works
By Paul Almond |
24 December 2005 |
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This is the fourth article in the series about Occam's razor. The last article
suggested that a single algorithmic description of reality is correct and that no
particular algorithmic description should be given preferred status. This means that
any algorithmic description of reality should be as likely as any other to be the
correct one. This may seem to contradict Occam's razor which suggests that certain
descriptions of reality - the "simpler" ones - are preferred. This article will
resolve this and describe how Occam's razor can actually work.
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Against the Idea that Religious Belief is Needed to Have Ethics
By Paul Almond |
04 December 2005 |
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There is a type of question which challenges an atheist to show how society could
have any ethics if there were no religion. The question is clearly intended to make
the point that society could not be ethical in the absence of religious belief to
provide ethical values by the presumed inability of an atheist to answer the question
satisfactorily. The purpose of this article is to refute the argument implicit in the
asking of this question.
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Occam's Razor Part 3: Assumptions About Reality
By Paul Almond |
13 November 2005 |
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This is the third article in the series about Occam's razor. There needs to be a kind
of way of looking at reality which allows us to determine which model is best for
describing it. This article will deal with this. It will present the minimal
meta-assumptions regarding reality that are needed to allow Occam's razor to be
obtained.
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Against the Idea that God is Superior to Logic
By Paul Almond |
20 October 2005 |
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Some theists claim that God is superior to logic, which is to say that God is unrestrained
by logic and that God is 'above logic'. This article will demonstrate that such claims
cause all proofs of God's existence to fail and that anyone making the claim that God is
above logic is depriving him/herself of any good arguments supporting God's existence.
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Occam's Razor Part 2: Principles of Language
By Paul Almond |
9 October 2005 |
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This is the second article in the series about Occam's razor.
The previous article Occam's
Razor Part 1: What is Occam's Razor? introduced the concept of Occam's razor and
discussed it in general terms. This article will deal with principles about how theories
should be expressed. The next article will deal with assumptions about reality, and how
theories relate to it, that are necessary to allow Occam's razor to be derived.
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The Diminished God Refutation: Why unlikely sequences of events do not prove a god
By Paul Almond |
24 September 2005 |
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One type of attempted proof of God refers to a sequence of events known to have
occurred, but considered to be outrageously unlikely. These events usually have a combined probability which is supposed to be very low and the proof suggests
that a God must have therefore been the real cause.
This article will refute this proof and weaken the case for the existence of God.
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Occam's Razor Part 1: What Is Occam's Razor?
By Paul Almond |
22 August 2005 |
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Occam's razor is a philosophical idea with importance in a number of areas, including scientific theory selection, human psychology
and artifical intelligence. This is the first of a series of articles which will attempt to describe Occam's razor
in a formal way and present a justification for it. In this article the idea of Occam's razor is described and its importance discussed.
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What is a Low Level Language
By Paul Almond |
17 July 2005 |
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The idea of 'low level' languages is one with which most computer programmers can deal intuitively, yet the term 'low level' is harder to define than is commonly thought.
What constitutes a low level language is of some philosophical importance. This article is intended to address this problem. It will discuss the idea of 'low level' language, consider the need for a workable concept of 'low level language' in philosophy and propose a way of defining it.
This article will precede a series that I intend to write about Occam's razor.
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Improving Computer Security
By Paul Almond |
06 July 2005 |
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This article discusses the threat posed to computer systems from programs that have been intentionally installed
on them by their legitimate users. Programs have enormous power on computers and the consequences of malicious intent or
carelessness by programmers can be serious. This issue will ultimately be more serious than the
issue of perimeter security in areas ranging from home computing to large scale government software contracts. This article proposes a security paradigm which could help to control this problem.
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Taking the Virtual out Of Virtual Reality
By Paul Almond |
17 March 2005 |
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An idea for placing virtual reality into reality to form a shared-augmented reality, occupying the existing reality with which we are familiar.
The shared-augmented reality could be altered in real-time by its users and the emphasis would be on users generating content rather than on it being
provided by some central source. This would be equivalent to projecting a three-dimensional version of the existing internet into physical reality.
This article discusses the implications of such a system and gives some consideration to the issue of how it could be built.
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Getting Darwinian Evolution to Work - Part 2
By Paul Almond |
18 November 2004 |
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In a previous article it was suggested that Darwinian evolution has higher levels of abstraction and that explicitly exploiting these in attempts to evolve software on computers could allow programs of greater sophistication. A multi-layered system was proposed which used the concept of 'evolving evolvability'. This article proposes an
improvement to this method which involves using a 'compilative' architecture.
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A Refutation of Penrose's Godel-Turing Proof that Computational Artificial Intelligence is Impossible
By Paul Almond |
24 October 2004 |
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In his 1994 book Shadows of the Mind Roger Penrose gave a proof attempting to show that computational artificial intelligence is impossible. The proof is often known as the Godelian proof or the Godel-Turing proof and is intended to show that there are certain facts that can be known to humans yet can never be known to algorithms. This article provides a refutation of Penrose's proof.
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Did 'I' Write This?
By Paul Almond |
08 October 2004 |
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Is it possible that certain technologies could appear to extend your life,
yet are so extreme that they actually fail because you are not the same person afterwards?
'Continuity of self' appears to be a simple and self-evident concept to many people who may have opinions
about whether various processes that humans can undergo would or would not preserve this continuity.
This article will suggest that this is a fallacy and that 'continuity of self' is an incoherent and unnecessary concept.
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Game Theory with Yourself
By Paul Almond |
30 December 2003 |
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What would it be like to play a game involving a duplicate of yourself? This article discusses various scenarios involving mind uploading and 'free will' within the context of games in which your reward depends on the actions of your duplicate.
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Could Computers be Religious?
By Paul Almond |
11 August 2003 |
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Discusses the possibility of computers acquiring religious beliefs in the future, within the context of a possible explanation for the occurrence of religion in human societies based on the social modelling capabilities of the brain.
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John Searle's Position within an Evolutionary Context
By Paul Almond |
09 August 2003 |
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An argument against John Searle's reasoning about consciousness that uses Darwin's theory of evolution to attempt to weaken his case. It is suggested
that statements made by Searle suggest that human consciousness is a very high specificity feature of
some biological systems that is not easily explained by Darwin's theory of evolution.
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Indirect Mind Uploading: Using AI to Avoid Staying Dead
By Paul Almond |
09 August 2003 |
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A consideration of life extension from an artificial intelligence
perspective, discussing the idea of indirect mind uploading - the idea that a
computer model could be made of a human mind without the use of sophisticated scanning technnologies.
The intention of this article is to present a mind uploading method that could be useful to a person who is alive today.
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Getting Darwinian Evolution to Work
By Paul Almond |
12 February 2003 |
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Suggests that Darwinian evolution has higher levels of abstraction and that explicitly exploiting these in attempts to evolve software on computers could allow programs of greater sophistication. A multi-layered system is proposed which uses the concept of 'evolving evolvability'.
This article was originally published at to http://ai-depot.com/Articles/54/Evolution.html on 12 February 2003 and a copy published here on 26 October 2004.
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